When the modern reader and the ancient biblical text do not share the same cosmology, this may lead to gross misinterpretation of the text, or to a reduction in meaning. The term רוח אלהים [spirit of God] is used as an example to illustrate the possibility of such misinterpretation. It is argued that the term should be viewed as a case of polysemy (words with multiple senses, which are not trivially related to one another) and thus form a rich complex (...) of meaning. This implies that the so-called fallacy of ‘illegitimate totality transfer’ does not apply to polysemous words, because all the senses are activated in every context. The senses of spirit, breath and wind should therefore not be viewed as alternative meanings (as one would do in the case of homonyms), but as contributing to a rich complex meaning, which makes logical sense within the magico-mythical cosmology of the Old Testament. (shrink)

The Netherdutch Reformed Church of Africa (NRCA) did not escape this existential crisis of conflict. It manifests in various ways resulting in the bleeding of congregations, the exodus of congregants and the closure of congregations, as many congregants that declare themselves as members of the Church do not attend worship services or participate in the Holy Communion and exit the church. The study was conducted in the NRCA to determine the effect and response formation of observed conflict by ministers in (...) their respective congregations. The results of the study indicate that pastors and/or ministers do suffer emotional trauma because of the conflict in the congregation which, according to their own statements results in a loss of role performance. We provide an overview of the problem statement and methodology of the study. We discuss an abbreviated, theoretical perspective on conflict as a social phenomenon. We present the findings of our study and conclude with an abbreviated process to equip pastors with the necessary emotional maturity and self-management.Contribution: This study uncovers emotional trauma experienced by ministers, affecting their role performance. We offer a succinct problem statement, research methodology, and propose a scientifically informed process to enhance ministers’ emotional resilience within the NRCA. (shrink)

This publication of Petrus de Alvernia's commentary on the Peripatetic treatise 'De vegetabilibus et plantis' provides infor-mation on the reception of this work, that reached the Latin West through an Arabic translation made from the Syrian version of the Greek, in the Parisian Facultas Artium.

This is an ambitious venture into the thicket of medieval philosophy: what is the true object of metaphysics? The book begins with a number of texts, printed after various manuscripts through which the author hopes to illustrate the development of a certain chain of ideas. After a short introduction on the Aristotelian and Arabic sources of the whole problematics, there are three fundamental solutions of the question: God is one of the many subjects of metaphysics, God is the cause of (...) the subject of metaphysics, God is a part of the subject of metaphysics. These major alternatives are followed by their respective development in the works of later authors. Besides the more usual writers like St. Thomas, Scotus, R. Bacon, Siger of Brabant, Henry of Ghent, we are given interesting and penetrating accounts of the ideas of men like Augustinus Triumphus of Ancona, Petrus of Alvernia, John Quidort of Paris, etc. Despite the first impression provoked by the table of contents this book is not a herbarium of rarities or curiosities but a highly concentrated and often fascinating study of the real topics of all metaphysics and through this perhaps of the very possibility of metaphysics as such.--M. J. V. (shrink)

This translation of a classic and original work of intellectual history is beautifully done. Rossi’s book Clavis Universalis was first published in Italian in 1960, but Clucas translates the second, revised edition of 1983. The book is about Renaissance and 17th-century encyclopedism, hieroglyphics and cryptography, the techniques of artificial memory, the history of rhetoric, changes in views about logic and method in the scientific revolution, and new ideas about how language and images might reflect or capture reality. Frances Yates’s brilliant (...) The Art of Memory, published in 1966, has so far had much more influence in the English-speaking world. Despite warm citations and many points of contact with Yates’s work, Rossi is less interested in uncovering hidden occult traditions, and more focussed on the way major 17th-century thinkers’ work must be understood against the rich background of schemes for universal grammar and local memory. He shows that scholars working on Bacon, Descartes, and Leibniz miss key references to this intellectual heritage. Half of the book [152] introduces relevant mnemonic, rhetorical, linguistic, medical, and occult writings. Rossi includes illuminating discussions not only of Ramon Lull, Petrus Ramus, Cornelius Agrippa, Giordano Bruno, and all, but also of fascinating minor writers like Guglielmo Gratorolo who systematized advice on medical aids to memory in the mid-16th century, and the wonderful Johannes Spangerbergius, who classified various forms of amnesia in 1570. He then argues that polemic against the arts of memory in both Bacon and Descartes coexisted with intense interest on their part in the supplementing of weak powers of natural memory by various artificial aids and objects outside the boundaries of skull and skin. Rossi tells the strange stories of the great 17th-century encyclopedists and universal language schemers—Alsted, Comenius, Wilkins, Dalgarno—making important connections between Wilkins’s scheme and worries about methods for botanical classification in the early Royal Society. The final chapter is a tour de force on ‘the sources of Leibniz’s universal character’, placing him (as Clucas neatly puts it) ‘at the “end” of a Renaissance intellectual tradition rather than reading him “forwards” as an innovative precursor of modern formal logic’. Historians of science, linguistics, and philosophy have built on many aspects of Rossi’s work since 1983, and Clucas contributes an outstanding introduction which summarizes key strands of recent scholarship. (shrink)

This article recounts the history of the composition, publication and dissemination of Edward Pococke’s translation into Arabic of Grotius, De Veritate, the motivation for making it alleged both by Grotius and by Pococke, and the changes in the text which were introduced by Pococke. An Appendix provides, for the two chapters which are most different from Grotius’s original, the Arabic text, a literal translation, Grotius’s Latin, and details of the sources of Grotius and Pococke for their accusations against the Muslims (...) in those chapters. (shrink)

Harvard Ms lat. 162 contains theological questions disputed at the University of Vienna between 1426 and the mid 1430s. The article identifies the respondents in these disputations, conducted under Petrus Reicher de Pirchenwart, regent master in theology. Although some of these theologians, such as Johannes de Gmund, Narcissus Hertz, and Thomas Ebendorfer are well known, most have not left any surviving theological writings. This makes these disputations particularly valuable for the intellectual history of the University of Vienna in the (...) second quarter of the fifteenth century. (shrink)

The congregation is challenged by modern times that require various life adjustments, including priestly pastoral ministry. Therefore, this study examined the pastoral ministry style for the parishioner’s rural community of St. Petrus Paulus Ampah Diocese in Palangka Raya. A descriptive qualitative approach was used with data collected using participatory observations, in-depth interviews and document studies. Furthermore, the data analysis involved reducing, displaying and process verification. The participants included parish priests, catechists and station council administrators. The results showed that the (...) congregations did not participate in church activities because the pastoral ministry style did not fulfil their needs, economic factors and lack of Catholic faith knowledge. Therefore, the church authorities in pastoral ministry should create a holistic and transformative congregation based on their needs. The current pastoral ministry practice is based on ecclesiastical organisation building and worship (liturgy) focused service. The church should simultaneously conduct catechism practices and charitable diaconia such as social, economic and spiritual activities. This was an interdisciplinary study that focused on practical and pastoral theology, catechesis and social sciences on Catholics’ pastoral ministry style for rural communities.Contribution: Importantly, it contributes to the literature on pastoral style reforms focusing on the congregation’s socio-economic life. Therefore, it can improve the congregation’s interests, ecclesiastical activities and independence. (shrink)

What is the status of a cat in a virtual reality environment? Is it a real object? Or part of a fiction? Virtual realism, as defended by D. J. Chalmers, takes it to be a virtual object that really exists, that has properties and is involved in real events. His preferred specification of virtual realism identifies the cat with a digital object. The project of this paper is to use a comparison between virtual reality environments and scientific computer simulations to (...) critically engage with Chalmers’s position. I first argue that, if it is sound, his virtual realism should also be applied to objects that figure in scientific computer simulations, e.g. to simulated galaxies. This leads to a slippery slope because it implies an unreasonable proliferation of digital objects. A philosophical analysis of scientific computer simulations suggests an alternative picture: The cat and the galaxies are parts of fictional models for which the computer provides model descriptions. This result motivates a deeper analysis of the way in which Chalmers builds up his realism. I argue that he buys realism too cheap. For instance, he does not really specify what virtual objects are supposed to be. As a result, rhetoric aside, his virtual realism isn’t far from a sort of fictionalism. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:A Visionary Approach: Lynn A. De Silva and The Prospects for Buddhist-Christian Encounter ed. by Elizabeth J. Harris and Perry Schmidt-LeukelLeo D. LefebureA VISIONARY APPROACH: LYNN A. DE SILVA AND THE PROSPECTS FOR BUDDHIST-CHRISTIAN ENCOUNTER. Edited by Elizabeth J. Harris and Perry Schmidt-Leukel. Sankt Ottilien: EOS, 2021. 390 pp.This volume presents essays exploring the legacy of Lynn A. de Silva (1919–1982), a Methodist pastor and biblical scholar in (...) Sri Lanka who was an important pioneer of Buddhist-Christian studies. Most of the chapters are based on presentations at the conference of the European Network of Buddhist-Christian Studies that met at the Benedictine Archabbey of St. Ottilien in 2019. Some of the authors, including Wesley Ariarajah, Aloysius Pieris, and Shantha de Silva (youngest son of Lynn de Silva), knew de Silva personally and offer warm tributes to his memory. Other authors work for institutions that carry on the types of projects that de Silva pioneered: Marshal Fernando is the Director of the Ecumenical Institute for Study and Dialogue, which de Silva founded and directed from 1962–1982; Indunil J. Kodithuwakku Kankanamalage, who is from Sri Lanka, serves as the Secretary of the Pontifical Council for Interreligious Dialogue; and Peniel Rajkumar leads the Interreligious Dialogue and Cooperation Programme of the World Council of Churches.Some authors examine how de Silva developed and modified his understanding of the relationship between Buddhist and Christian perspectives. In his early work in the 1960s, de Silva responded to Buddhist misunderstandings of Christian faith and practice. In the 1970s, he explored how Buddhist teachings could be related to biblical and Christian perspectives in ways that could enhance Christian faith. Toward the end of his life de Silva pondered the degree to which Buddhist and Christian perspectives could be relativized and harmonized.Benedictine Abbot Petrus Hohensteiger traces the development of de Silva's responses to Buddhist belief in reincarnation. De Silva came to reject traditional Protestant Christian eschatology that teaches that a single lifetime will be followed by eternal heaven or hell; but he also rejected Theravada belief in rebirth. Instead, while remaining a Protestant Christian, he developed a belief in purgatory that allowed for self-purification and growth in sanctity after death. De Silva interpreted Buddhist belief in rebirth and Christian belief in resurrection as symbolic pointers toward a single, shared truth of self-negating, self-emptying love.Andreas Nehring focuses on de Silva's study of Buddhism as a popular religion combining Buddhist perspectives with folk religious practices. Drawing on the critical hermeneutics of Paul Ricoeur, Nehring emphasizes the ways in which de Silva's [End Page 403] sympathetic attention to folk Buddhism can shift the dialogue between Buddhists and Christians in positive ways. Gudrun Löwner explores how de Silva turned to visual art and aesthetics to promote mutual understanding between Buddhists and Christians. Amos Yong reflects on de Silva's pneumatological anthropology in conversation with Theravada Buddhists, mentioning the shared effort to find an alternative to eternalism or nihilism. While noting many points of convergence, Yong finds an important difference from Theravada anthropology in de Silva's eschatological interpretation of the corporate and resurrected Spiritual Body of the Apostle Paul.Kurt Gakuro Krammer reflects on how Buddhist-Christian dialogue can change one's understanding of the human being. Observing that most European Buddhists have thus far avoided dialogue, he proposes that de Silva can offer a helpful model of dialogical understanding but also poses the pointed question of whether dialogue has any soteriological impact, such as upon efforts toward social action. This volume is a very important contribution that will be of interest to all persons involved in Buddhist-Christian dialogue.Leo D. LefebureGeorgetown UniversityCopyright © 2022 University of Hawai'i Press... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:POMPONAZZI'S CRITIQUE OF AQUCNAS'S ARGUMENTS FOR THE :IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL JOHN L. TRELOAR, S.J. Marquette University Milwaukee, Wisconsin I. lntJroWi.wtion IN 'JiHE COURSE of hls discussion on the immortality of the soul, Pietro Pomponazzi systematically critiques the Pfatonic, Avel'IJ'IOist, and Thomistic positions concerning this perennial problem iin the philosophy of human nature. Pomponiazzi's Tractatrus de irnrmortalitate animae 1 is inteirestin!g from three methodological standpoints: (1) the criteria Pomponazzi (...) uses to ev:aluate the various positions, (2) Pomponazzi 's attempt to redefine the probtlem of immortality in fo:gica;l terms, and (8) his analysis of previous positions. In this Renaissance treatise one finds an excellent example of the infliuence of method on the dev:elopment of an idea. This article wiihl eX'amine and ev:aluate Pomponazzi's analy,s:i.s of Thomas A:quiinas's aJ.'gument for the immortality of the soul showing how Pomponazzi''S irefo:rnnula;bion puts the Thomistic argument in a context completely differoort fmm whait Thomas himself intended. Although this ipaper treats a historical pr01blem, its mai:i.n oibject is to show how the fo:tmulation of phifosophical critema and,questions influences how one handles a topic 1 and 1 The standard Latin text of the Tractatus is: Petrus Pomponatus, Tractatus de immortalitate animae, ed. Gianfranco Morra (Bologna: Nanni and Fiammeghi, 1954). The English translations used in this article are from Ernst Cassirer et al., eds. The Renaissance Philosophy of Man (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948). A complete translation of the Tractatus by William Henry Hay II, revised by John Herman Randall, Jr., and annotated by Paul Oskar Kristeller, appears on pp. 280-381. 458 454 JOHN L. TRELOAR, S.J, what one says about prewous solutions to a problem. This article, then, studies a rphi1osophica1l methodology as much as it arppraises Pomrponazzi and Aquinas.2 Eady in the Tractatus de immortalitate animae Pomponazzi 'es'tia;bJishes the dual cr1iter:ia for judging the adequacy of au p!i.'evious arguments ]or the immortaJl~ty of the,soul. First, "Leaving aside revefaition and miracles, and remaining entirely within natmal limits," 3 what can be said concerrning the immortality of the soul? Second, "what... was Aristotle's opin~on on the same question "?4 These criteria function as the limiting conditions that determine the adequacy of any argument :for immortality; Pomponazzi employs these criteria riJgm~ously to test whether previious a1rguments are adeqU'ate. Pomponazzi's attempt to l'edefine immo:rtality in strictly 1ogicail terms also influences his critique of pl'evious authoi's :and his own generail condusions. He picks u:p Fieino'.s notion that the human being is of an ambiguous nature, that is, part spirit 1and pa:rt oorpore1 al.5 This, of course, is new neither with Ficino nor with Pomponazzi, for the concept of a twofold nature goes hack at least as ia1· as Plwto. Plomponazzi',s use of 1this concept of a twofold nature, however, is unique. He casts the whole 2 In his book Renaissance Thought and Its Sources (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979), Paul Oskar Kristeller says, "Among the many problems and concepts that have occupied the thinkers of the past, and especially those of the Renaissance, the doctrine of immortality seems especially remote from the discussions and concerns of our time" (p. 181). He argues in this essay that, "The problem is still with us, and we may hope that it may yet lead to new answers that are more in accordance with our knowledge and our sensibilities than those transmitted to us by the thinkers of the past, especially those of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries" (p. 196). s "Primum scilicet, quid, revelationibus et miraculis semotis, persistendoque pure infra limites naturales, hac in re sentis." Immortalitate, p. 36 (p. 281). All references to the Traatatus de immortalitate animae will appear in this form. The first page reference is to the Latin text and the page number in parentheses is to the English translation cited above. 4 "Alterum vero, quamnam sententiam Aristotelis in eadem materiam fuisse censes." Imrnortalitate, p. 36 (p. 281). 5 See Marsilius Ficino, " Five Questions Concerning the... (shrink)

What are physical quantities, and in particular, what makes them quantitative? This book presents an original answer to this question through the novel position of substantival structuralism, arguing that quantitativeness is an irreducible feature of attributes, and quantitative attributes are best understood as substantival structured spaces.

On March 27, 1784, Goethe writes to Johann Gottfried Herder: -/- I have found–neither gold nor silver, but what makes me unspeakably happy–the os intermaxillare in the human! With Loder I compared human and animal skulls, came upon its trace, and look, there it is. Only, I beg of you not to mention it, since it must be handled confidentially. (WA 4.6:258). -/- The bone whose discovery so elated Goethe, then called the "intermaxillary bone" but now the "premaxilla," is a (...) pair of cranial bones that are located at the front of the upper jaw and bear the incisors in animals that have these teeth. Goethe expresses happiness in finding this bone specifically in humans, a discovery that opposed the prevailing anatomical opinion at the time. Goethe in the Roman Campagna (1787) – Johann Heinrich Wilhelm Tischbein -/- In his essay that was finished by the end of October 1784 and later given the title, "An Intermaxillary Bone of the Maxilla Is to Be Ascribed to the Human as well as to Animals." Goethe claims, citing the work of J. F. Blumenbach and Petrus Camper, that the bone has recently garnered attention as a "distinguishing mark" between humans and apes (LA 1.9:154). -/- Yet, upon reexamination of these anatomists' works, I argue that Goethe misrepresents their positions and overstates the significance of his discovery, at least in a certain sense: while Camper and Blumenbach do deny the intermaxillary bone to humans, they do not construe its absence as an important distinguishing mark between humans and animals. Not only did Goethe's discovery not have the significance he attributed to it, but also historians of science claim that he did not discover it all: the intermaxillary bone had already been described in the human by several anatomists before him. It would thus seem that Goethe misinterpreted the significance of what he had not found, and that his unspeakable happiness was unwarranted. -/- However, Goethe's discovery holds another, heretofore-unrecognized significance. I argue that it signals a change in his vision of nature to one that criticizes and departs from the anthropocentric ontology that grounded the natural sciences of his time. If this anthropocentricism is not overturned and the foundation of natural science not reconceived, Goethe maintains, then the study of nature will be indefinitely frustrated, always floundering, and never able to progress. In light of this threat, Goethe reconceives the foundation of natural science by developing anonathropocentric concept of nature that attempts to escape the pitfalls of the human-centered perspective. His concept of nature's harmony, which I argue reflects a nonathropocentric visions of nature, requires the revaluation of the terms in which historians have disputed his discovery of the intermaxillary bone; the originality of his discovery cannot be limited to establishing the bone's presence in humans but must be extended to the concept of nature's harmony complementary to it. -/- Goethe's discovery, I conclude, remains valuable and worthy of the excitement it initially incites in him. I show how it responds to a paradox of contemporary natural science in which the objective methods intended to eliminate anthropocentrism from the investigation of nature surreptitiously reintroduced it to that investigation. Furthermore, I argue that Goethe's nonanthropocentric vision of nature and his criticism of anthopocentricism are applicable to current questions in environmental ethics. By undermining the foundation of anthropocentric ethics, Goethe also challenges the present anthropocentric modus operandi that continues to condone the environmentally destructive anthropogenic activities responsible for species extinction, chemical pollution, and the loss of natural habitats and biodiversity, in addition to other signs of the Anthropocene. (shrink)

The idea that immoral behaviour can sometimes be admirable, and that moral behaviour can sometimes be less than admirable, has led several of its supporters to infer that moral considerations are not always overriding, contrary to what has been traditionally maintained. In this paper I shall challenge this inference. My purpose in doing so is to expose and acknowledge something that has been inadequately appreciated, namely, the moral aspect of nonmoral goods and evils. I hope thereby to show that, even (...) if immorality can be admirable, this poses no threat to morality. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Adam Smith and the History of the Invisible HandPeter HarrisonFew phrases in the history of ideas have attracted as much attention as Smith’s “invisible hand,” and there is a large body of secondary literature devoted to it. In spite of this there is no consensus on what Smith might have intended when he used this expression, or on what role it played in Smith’s thought. Estimates of its significance (...) range from the laudatory—“one of the great ideas of history,” to the dismissive—“an ironic joke.”1 Commentators are also divided on whether Smith’s “invisible hand” has teleological or providential connotations, or whether it is simply a rhetorical device. John Kenneth Galbraith declared that we do a grave disservice to Smith if we insist on understanding his invisible hand as a kind of “spiritual force.”2 Spenser J. Pack maintained that the invisible hand was “a rhetorical device which Smith made up, and knew he made up” and certainly “not [End Page 29] a theological underpinning for Smith’s social and/or economic theory.”3 Others have adopted the opposite view. Jacob Viner contended that Smith’s economic theory becomes unintelligible if “the invisible hand” is evacuated of its theological significance.4 For David A. Martin, Smith’s use of the phrase pointed to the foundational role played by divine wisdom in Smith’s thought, while for Andy Denis, “the invisible hand concept in Smith was entirely and unambiguously theological.”5Surprisingly, given this situation, a systematic study of the uses of the expression before Smith has yet to be made.6 Indeed, it is not unusual to find claims that Smith invented the expression himself, or that it was primarily owing to his influence that the phrase first became widespread.7 Those who have made perfunctory efforts at a history of the phrase generally point to a few scattered literary references with a view either to judging them irrelevant to Smith’s oeuvre, or to suggesting that Smith’s (admittedly meagre) uses of the phrase are empty metaphors. This paper seeks to remedy this deficiency, offering a history of “the invisible hand” with a particular focus on the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. What clearly emerges from this survey is that the concept was relatively common by the time Smith came to use it. Moreover, while “invisible hand” was used in a variety of contexts, by far the most common involved reference to God’s [End Page 30] oversight of human history and to his control of the operations of nature. Almost certainly, then, when readers encountered the phrase in Smith, they would have understood it as referring to God’s unseen agency in political economy. Whether Smith was himself committed to such a view is more difficult to determine, but the history of the expression and the contexts in which it appears in Smith’s writings offer some support for providentialist readings.Hidden and Invisible HandsThe expression “invisible hand” was not commonly used before the seventeenth century. It does not occur in classical literature (although some have suggested that the phrase may be found in Ovid).8 Neither does it appear in the Hebrew Bible or the New Testament.9 The earliest reference that I have found occurs in a Greek liturgy which invokes God’s “invisible right hand which is full of blessing.”10 The liturgy was used by the Alexandrian Church and its origins date back (probably) to the second century. However, [End Page 31] the expression is relatively rare in subsequent patristic and medieval writings. In one of his Old Testament commentaries, Alexandrian Church father Origen (185–254 ce) attributed the Israelites’ defeat of the Amalekites, recorded in Exodus 17, to the agency of God’s hidden hand.11 Some later sources made reference to the work of a “hidden” or “invisible” hand of God in restoring individuals to health. Augustine of Hippo (354–430 ce) thus spoke of the hidden hand of God which heals and makes whole.12 A medieval source refers similarly to a wound being healed by the touch of an invisible hand.13 French Benedictine Petrus Cellensis (1115–83 ce) alluded to the action... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Descartes’ Meditations: Background Source Materials ed. by Roger Ariew, John Cottingham, and Tom SorellRichard A. WatsonRoger Ariew, John Cottingham, and Tom Sorell, editors. Descartes’ Meditations: Background Source Materials. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. Pp. xviii + 170. Cloth, $54.95. Paper, $18.95.This volume includes primarily source materials from authors who were contemporary to Descartes’s composition of the Meditations. Thus there are no selections from Augustine, Aquinas, and Montaigne, for (...) example, who were more influential on the Meditations than some of the authors excerpted. Of course their influence is already amply documented by such scholars as Gilson and Gouhier. Probably the most important source included is Suárez, whose role is championed by Jean-Luc Marion in several works. Readers should look for the forthcoming Index Augustino-Cartèsian: Textes et Commentaire by Zbigniew Janowski (Paris: J. Vrin) for a startling challenge to the view that Descartes is Suárezian.In the volume under review, Eustachius a Sancto Paulo is of special interest because Descartes thought of refuting him item by item (but decided exposition of his own view would be adequate). In his youth Descartes had a definite interest in Petrus Ramus, although Beeckman told him his method consisted of tired old tricks. Francisco Sanches and Pierre Charron are important for their expositions of sceptical arguments and attitudes. Christopher Clavius is Descartes’s direct predecessor in mathematical analysis, and none of Descartes’s protests that he never read the man has convinced anyone. Scipion Dupleix is a fine example of how the Old Philosophy appeared to the New Philosophers, and Marin Mersenne, of course, compiled material on every subject Descartes ever had an interest in. Pierre Gassendi exercised Descartes’s ire more than any other commentator on the Meditations, and Descartes again probably read Gassendi’s continuing criticisms even though he claimed he wouldn’t. [End Page 366]Of special interest is Jean de Silhon, an old friend of Descartes’s who published a book containing a proto-cogito three years before the Meditations appeared. François de la Mothe le Vayer represents the libertine strain many detect in Descartes’s writings, while Jean-Baptiste Morin provides fodder for those who detect Descartes’s piety, although Descartes asserts that the man is an idiot for defending the immobility of the earth. Finally, Charles Sorel provides an example of the deductive mode of exposition in a text that shows that the notion of a unified science was more than Cartesian. One contemporary who was left out and should have been included was the Augustinian Guillaume Gibieuf.But overall, this is an interesting and useful collection of works Descartes doubtless knew. [End Page 367]Richard A. WatsonWashington UniversityCopyright © 1999 Johns Hopkins University Press... (shrink)

_The Foundations of Arithmetic_ is undoubtedly the best introduction to Frege's thought; it is here that Frege expounds the central notions of his philosophy, subjecting the views of his predecessors and contemporaries to devastating analysis. The book represents the first philosophically sound discussion of the concept of number in Western civilization. It profoundly influenced developments in the philosophy of mathematics and in general ontology.